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evity cannot explain the signiﬁcant accumulation of human capital during
the transition from stagnation to growth. This is because greater longevity
raises children’s future income proportionally at all levels of education, leav-
ing the relative return between quality and quantity unaffected. This result
is consistent with historical evidence that longevity began to increase long
before education did. Our theory also casts doubts on recent ﬁndings about
a positive effect of health on education. This is because health raises the mar-
ginal return on quality and quantity, resulting in an ambiguous effect on the
accumulation of human capital. We conclude that longevity and health have
had a minor effect, if any, on the transition from stagnation to growth via
investment in education.
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Recent studies have focused on the role of longevity in explaining economic
growth through investment in education. These studies have utilized the mecha-
nism of the seminal work of Yormam Ben-Porath (1967), according to which pro-
longing the period in which individuals may receive returns on their investment
spurs investment in human capital.1 Given the historical relationship among
longevity, education, and per-capita output, which have been increasing simulta-
neously and monotonically since the middle of nineteenth century, it is appealing
to suggest that the causality runs from longevity to growth through education.
This literature, however, disregards fertility choice.2
The historical evidence, however, shows that output growth and population
growth have been positively correlated throughout most of human history and
that the reversal of this relationship in Western Europe in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century marked the beginning of the modern growth era. This cor-
relation is so profound that it has been the focus of the oldest growth theory,
conceived by Malthus (1798). About ﬁfteen years ago, nearly two hundred years
after Malthus and thirty years after the renewal of interest in economic growth,
population growth resurfaced as a central building block in growth theory. Ear-
lier models such as Barro and Becker (1989), Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990),
and Galor and Weil (2000) incorporated fertility choice into these models, fo-
cusing on the negative correlation between population growth and income in the
modern era. As growth theory continued to develop, new theories have emerged
that explain the long-term development process from early human society to the
modern era (Galor and Weil (2000), Jones (2001), Galor and Moav (2002), and
Lucas (2002)). Population growth is central in all of them.3
A more realistic framework for exploration of the effect of longevity on in-
1For instance see Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000), Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro
(2002), Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2003), Cervellati and Sunde (2005), and Soares
(2005), among others.
2In Soares (2005), fertility is endogenous and parents invest in their children’s human capital
and in their own. In reference to one’s own investment in human capital, Soares employs the
Ben-Porath mechanism and assumes that the impact of an increase in children’s longevity on
their human capital is positive.
3See Galor (2004) for a survey of these theories.
1vestment in education would assume that education choices are made by par-
ents in combination with fertility choice. Several studies have conjectured that
the Ben-Porath mechanism remains relevant within this framework (Galor and
Weil (1999), (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000)). Their argument is based on the intu-
itive proposition that greater longevity of children will raise the rate of return on
investments in children’s human capital and, for this reason, may induce house-
holds to make quality-quantity tradeoffs.
Our paper shows that this intuition is misleading and that the Ben-Porath
mechanism may fail to hold once parents make choices over education and fer-
tility. Although this outcome may seem counterintuitive, it is in fact straight-
forward. If parental preferences are homothetic with respect to the quality and
quantity of their children, an increase in children’s longevity will increase each
child’s income proportionally irrespective of her level of education. Thus, it does
not change the relative return between quality (education) and quantity (fertil-
ity) and, hence, cannot cause any increase in the level of education chosen by the
parents.4 We call this result the ”neutrality result.” Thus, unless we accept the
argument that individuals increase their investment in formal education upon
reaching adulthood in anticipation of a longer productive life, our result casts
doubt on the relevance of the Ben-Porath mechanism in explaining the observed
increase in formal-education investment in its historical context.5
The historical evidence lends credence to our neutrality result. As we show
in detail in Part 2, life expectancy of adults has been increasing monotonically
at least since early eighteenth century whereas education was relatively low and
stagnant until the middle of the nineteenth century, when it started its secular
increase. This raises the question why the causality has held since the middle of
the nineteenth century but not before.
Ehrlich and Lui (1991) and Lagerlof (2003) attempt to explore the effect of
longevity on growth via investment in education in models where fertility is en-
4Moav (2005) discusses this result without formalizing it.
5We claim that the Ben-Porath’s argument is highly questionable due to the low levels of edu-
cation attained in the nineteenth century. For example, average years of schooling in England and
Wales were 2.3 and 5.2 for the cohorts born in 1801-1805 and 1852-1856, respectively (Matthews,
Feinstein and Odling-Smee 1982). It is highly unrealistic to think that the prolongation of produc-
tive life induces individuals who were so poorly schooled as children to invest in their human
capital as adults.
2dogenous. Both of these models, however, disregarded the effect of children’s
longevity on the investment in their education, focusing instead on the effect
of parents’ longevity on resource allocation for children. According to Ehrlich
and Lui (1991), the share of resources allocated to quality depends on the level
of parents’ human capital, whereas according to Lagerlof (2003) it depends on
technological progress.6
The discussion thus far casts doubts on the argument that longevity has a pos-
itive effect on the acquisition of human capital during the transition from stag-
nation to growth. Since longevity may be thought of as the outcome of health,
we examine below whether improvements in health may account for the accu-
mulation of human capital during this transition process.7 Although longevity
and health are conceptually related, at the theoretical level they are differenti-
ated because longevity measures the length of life while health measures one’s
physiological condition at a given point in time. In the context of this paper,
longevity measures the length of productive life whereas health measures labor
productivity per unit of time.
Many attempts have been made to assess the direct effect of health on growth,
as well as the indirect effect of health via the accumulation of human capital. Fo-
gel (1994) and Shastry and Weil (2003) quantiﬁed the direct effect of health on
long-term per-capita growth and cross-country income differences. Fogel (1994),
estimatingtheincreaseinenergyavailabletotheBritishpopulationbetween1790
and 1980, argues that the increase in caloric intake boosted labor-force participa-
tion and the intensity of work per hour and traces roughly one-third of per-capita
income growth in England during that period to this increase in labor input.8
Similarly, using current cross-country data, Shastry and Weil (2003) estimate the
direct contribution of health to cross-country differences in per-capita output and
ﬁnd that health may account for one-third of the variation that is left unexplained
byothermeasuresoffactoraccumulation. Alderman, Behrman, LavyandMenon
6As we show in section 2, gains in adults’ longevity were modest during the second half of the
nineteenth century. Consequently, the effect of longevity on education could not have accounted
for much of the substantial increase in education during that time.
7Many empirical studies use life expectancy and health interchangeably (Shastry and Weil
2003, e.g.)
8Fogel bases his argument on the ﬁrst law of thermodynamics, which states that energy output
cannot exceed energy input.
3(2001), Bleakley (2003), Miguel and Kremer (2003), Behrman and Rosenzweig
(2001), and Behrman and Lavy (1997) estimate the impact of health on educa-
tion. Alderman et al. (2001) ﬁnd that children’s health positively affects school
enrolment. Bleakley (2003) ﬁnds that the eradication of hookworm disease in the
American South circa 1910 led to an increase in school attendance and literacy
rates and to substantial gains in income. Miguel and Kremer (2003) ﬁnd that the
eradication of intestinal helminthes among school-aged children in Kenya has
boosted school attendance although not school achievements. Finally, Behrman
and Rosenzweig (2001) ﬁnd that, controlling for genetic and family-background
endowments, birth weight has a signiﬁcant positive effect on school attainments.
In contrast, Behrman and Lavy (1997) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of a child’s health
on her success in school.
We incorporate health into the model by assuming that it joins education as
an input in the production of human capital. We assume that the production
function exhibits positive and decreasing marginal product in health and edu-
cation and that the two inputs are complements. A naive conclusion would be
that the complementarity assumption is sufﬁcient to assure that improvements
in health would increase the investment in education (quality). Health improve-
ments, however, not only increase the return on quality but also raise the level
of human capital, i.e., the return on quantity. Consequently, the optimal level of
education will rise only if the return on quality increases by more than the return
on quantity. The implied premise that the production function of human capital
must satisfy to generate this result is difﬁcult to justify. Speciﬁcally, the degree of
complementarity between health and education has to be high enough to elicit
this result. For a household that chooses quality and quantity jointly, the evi-
dence of Fogel (1994) is consistent with a sufﬁciently high degree of substitutabil-
ity between health and education.9 We conjecture that health improvements have
had little if any indirect effect on growth via investment in education. Notably,
this result does not contradict with the aforementioned ﬁndings of Alderman et
9Improvements in health have been detected in the Western population since the early nine-
teenth century and have been intensifying since the middle of that century (Mokyr and Stein
1997). Child labor, which was already a common practice before the nineteenth century, became
more prevalent during that century and peaked in England and Wales between 1861 and 1871
(Cunningham 1996). Thus, our interpretation of this evidence is that better health increased chil-
dren’s labor productivity, causing child labor to increase (Hazan and Berdugo 2002).
4al. (2001), Bleakley (2003), Miguel and Kremer (2003), and Behrman and Rosen-
zweig (2001), since all these studies abstract from fertility choice. Behrman and
Lavy (1997) use family ﬁxed effects that control, among other things, for fertility.
Interestingly, their ﬁndings are consistent with our theory.
Our theory has important policy implications for international aid to poor
countries. It suggests that although health interventions may be justiﬁed by their
direct contribution to quality of life and per-capita income, when tallying up the
costs and beneﬁts of these interventions one should bear in mind that longevity
and health have no effect on the relative return on education.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part 2 sets forth the historical ev-
idence regarding the joint evolution of education and longevity. Part 3 formalizes
our arguments and Part 4 presents concluding remarks.
2 The Historical Evidence
2.1 The Evolution of Longevity
Conventional wisdom suggests that life expectancy has been rising throughout
human history, although at a negligible pace during most of this period.11 Life
expectancy at birth in England ﬂuctuated around an average of 35 years during
the pre-industrial revolution (1541-1760). During the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial
Revolution, life expectancy increasedat a modest rate, edging upwardto 40 years
in 1850 before accelerating to nearly 50 years at the end of the nineteenth century,
more than 66 by the middle of the twentieth century, and 77 by 2002 (Dublin,
Lotka and Speigelman 1947, Wrigley and Schoﬁeld 1981, World-Bank 2004).
Our theory, however, focuses on longevity of adults. Life expectancy condi-
tioned on survival to adulthood has been making less dramatic progress. Life
expectancy for females at age 30 in England, for example, rose from slightly
10Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) ﬁnd that life expectancy converged among countries over
the period 1965-1995 and argue that if one takes into consideration not only income per capita but
also life expectancy as a measure of welfare, the data suggest convergence rather than divergence
among countries over that period.
11Galor and Moav (2004) survey evidence that life expectancy declined around the time of the
agricultural revolution (c. 7000 BCE). They develop an evolutionary growth model, arguing that
the gains in longevity in recent centuries trace to a process of natural selection.
5more than 60 in 1700-1750 to about 64 in the 1840s and less than 66 by 190012
(Dublin, Lotka and Speigelman 1949, Wrigley and Schoﬁeld 1981). Similarly, life
expectancy at age 20 in Sweden climbed from about 60 in 1785 to roughly 66
by 1890 (Keyﬁtz and Flieger 1968). Furthermore, gains in life expectancy con-
ditioned on survival to adulthood predated the gains in life expectancy at birth.
Data from Geneva and Venice on cohorts born in 1625-1825 and 1630-1740, re-
spectively, suggest that death rates dropped monotonically and that most of the
decrease occurred in the 40-65 age range13 (Boucekkine et al. 2003). In the US,
adults’ death rates have been trending down since the seventeenth century. In
particular, the probability that a cohort that reached the age of 20 would survive
to age 50 increased monotonically from 0.585 in 1650-1700 to 0.74 in 1850 and to
0.95 in 196014 (Fischer 1978).
2.2 The Evolution of Education
Although the secular rise in life expectancy has been accompanied by a signiﬁ-
cant increase in human-capital formation since the second half of the nineteenth
century, education in England was not widespread until that time. In particular,
literacy rates soared from a rather constant level of about 65 percent in 1760-1830
to nearly 100 percent at the end of the nineteenth century (Stone 1969, Clark 2003)
and the proportion of children aged 5-14 in school rose from 0.11 in 1855 to 0.74
in 1900 (Flora, Kraus and Pfenning 1983). Average years of schooling climbed
from only 2.3 for the cohort born in 1801-1805 to 5.2 for the cohort born in 1852-
1856 and 9.1 for the cohort born in 1897-1906 (Matthews et al. 1982). Finally, the
average years of schooling of the male labor force in England, relatively stagnant
until 1830s, nearly tripled by 1900 (Matthews et al. 1982).15
This evidence suggests that although a positive correlation between life ex-
pectancy and education has been prevalent since the middle of the nineteenth
12The gains for males were more modest.
13They do not report, however, quantitative gains in longevity.
14Figures 1, 2 and 3 present the data on longevity for England, Sweden, and the US, respec-
tively.
15Similar patterns appear throughout Europe and the United States. For a survey of the evolu-
tion of education in Europe and the US and the rise of the public education, see Galor and Moav
(2003).
6century, the onset of the secular increase in education lagged behind that of
longevity by one hundred if not two hundred years.16
3 The Model
The model consists of two periods, t and t + 1, and there is no discounting of the
future by any agent. It is assumed that a representative adult possesses linear
technology, making marginal productivity constant and is set equal to 1. At the
beginning of period t, she decides how much to consume, ct, how many children
to have, nt, and how much education to give each child, et+1. The adult lives a
fraction ¼t of period t and is endowed with ht units of human capital. Thus, she
divides her full income, between childraising and labor force participation.17
Let ¿ + et+1 be the time cost for an adult of producing a child with education
level et+1. That is, ¿ is the time needed to raise a child irrespective of quality
and et+1 is the time devoted to each child’s education. Hence, the time-cost of
raising nt children at education level et+1 is (¿ +et+1)nt. In period t+1, each child
becomes an adult who lives a fraction ¼t+1 of the period.
Each level of education is translated into human capital according to the pro-
duction function h(e), where h(¢) is assumed to be twice continuously differen-
tiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
Parental utility is denoted by Wt = W(ct;nt¼t+1h(et+1)), i.e., the parent’s pref-
erences are deﬁned over household consumption as well as the full income of her
offspring. Following Becker (1991), we assume that Wt is separable. Thus:
Wt = U(ct) + V (nt¼t+1h(et+1)) (1)
where U and V are both twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
and strictly concave.18
16Figure 4 presents the data on longevity and education in England.
17Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) argues that when there is a precautionary demand for children, declin-
ing child mortality-another important aspect of increase in life expectancy-may have a strong
negative effect on fertility. Doepke (2004) shows quantitatively that the incorporation of sequen-
tial fertility choice eliminates the impact of the decline in child mortality on fertility. Thus, we
abstract from child mortality and treat nt as the number of surviving children.
18Note that nothing hinges on the separability of U and V .
7The adult in period t faces the following budget constraint:
¼tht = ct + (¿ + et+1)ntht (2)
3.1 Longevity and Exogenous Fertility
To illustrate the mechanism proposed in Ben-Porath’s pioneering work (1967),
which has been recently employed in the growth literature, this section treats
fertility as exogenous. Therefore, we set nt = 1. Maximizing 1 with respect to 2





The left-hand side (henceforth: LHS) of 3 is the marginal cost of educating a
child, measured in terms of the loss of utility from foregone consumption, and
the right-hand side (henceforth: RHS) of 3 is the marginal utility of educating
a child in terms of the utility gain from an increase in the child’s full income.
Note that the LHS of 3 is continuously increasing in et+1 while the RHS of 3 is
continuously decreasing in et+1. We assume the existence of an interior solution,
denoted by e¤
t+1, that satisﬁes 3.
The LHS of 3 is independent of the longevity of the child, ¼t+1, whereas the
RHS of 3 may decrease, increase, or be independent of ¼t+1. Note that the RHS of
3 is composed of two elements. The ﬁrst element, V 0(¼t+1h(et+1)), is the marginal
utility that a parent derives from the child’s full income. The second element,
¼t+1h0(et+1), is the change in the child’s full income for a marginal increase in ed-
ucation as life prolongs. Since the two elements act in opposite directions, the
Ben-Porath mechanism is not robust to the assumption who chooses the opti-
mal level of education. The rationale is that when an individual decides on her
level of education she chooses the level that maximizes her lifetime consumption.
When she chooses the level of her child’s education, she has to forgo some of her
consumption to give her child more education.
Therefore, an increase in the longevity of the child has a positive effect on
education if and only if:






This elicits the following proposition:
Proposition 1 ”The Modiﬁed Ben-Porath Mechanism.” When fertility is exogenous,
an increase in children’s longevity increases the optimal educational level if and only if
Inequality 4 holds.
3.2 Longevity and Endogenous Fertility








0(ct)(¿ + et+1)ht = V
0(nt¼t+1h(et+1))¼t+1h(et+1) (6)
Note that 5 resembles 3 except that fertility is endogenous. The LHS of 5 is the
marginal cost of children, measured in the utility loss from foregone consump-
tion, and RHS of 5 is the marginal utility from children, measured in the utility







where the LHS of 7 is the relative price of education in terms of fertility and
the RHS of 7 is the marginal rate of substitution between education and fertility.
Note that the marginal rate of substitution between education and fertility is in-
dependent of children’s longevity because longevity has a symmetrical effect on
the marginal utility from fertility and the marginal utility from education. This
leads us to the following proposition:
20Note that the LHS of Inequality 4 is the elasticity of V 0(¢) with respect to ¼t+1h(¢). There-
fore, Inequality 4 implies that the percentage change in ¼t+1h(¢) is greater than that of V 0(¢) for





1¡°(¼t+1h(et+1))1¡° with ° < 1 satisﬁes Inequality 4.
9Proposition 2 ”The Neutrality Result.” When fertility is endogenous, an increase in
children’s longevity has no effect on the optimal level of education.
Proposition 2 suggests that the positive effect of the prolongation of produc-
tive life on the acquisition of human capital obtained in growth models is cru-
cially dependent on the assumption that fertility is exogenous.21
3.3 Health and Endogenous Fertility
In this part we examine whether improvements in health can account for the
accumulation of human capital. In view of the evidence surveyed in the Intro-
duction, the most general way to incorporate health into our analysis is to as-
sume that health is an input in the production of human capital. Technically,
h = h(et+1;µt+1) where µt+1 is the level of health of each child and h(et+1;µt+1) is
an increasing and strictly concave function of both arguments. Furthermore, we
assume that education and health are complements in the production of human
capital, i.e., heµ(et+1;µt+1) > 0. By solving the maximization problem in Part B







Note that for a given value for µt+1, 8 has a unique solution for et+1. Inspec-
tionofthesolutionsuggestsanothercounterintuitiveresult. Whileonemaythink
thatthecomplementarityofhealthandeducationsufﬁcestoensurethatimprove-
ments in health will tip the coin in favor of quality at the expense of quantity, this
is not necessarily so. Inspection of the RHS of 8 suggests that although improve-
ment in health increases the marginal return on quality, it also increases the mar-
ginal return on quantity. Thus, the marginal rate of substitution between the two
may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. Therefore, health improvements




21The result derived here relies on the homothetic preferences of parents with respect to the
quantity and quality of their children. Speciﬁcally, we could rewrite the utility function as Wt =
U(ct) + V (¼t+1nt;¼t+1h(et+1)). If (V1=V2) is independent of ¼t+1 the neutrality result follows.
10This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When fertility is endogenous, improvements in children’s health have a
positive effect on education investment if and only if Inequality 9 holds.
Inequality 9 states that the percentage increase in ht+1 due to a marginal in-
crease in et+1 is increasing in µt+1. Technically, Condition 9 holds if the degree
of complementarity between education and health is sufﬁciently high.22 While
the degree of complementarity of education and health is an empirical issue
that has not yet been explored, it seems a relatively restrictive assumption. Sup-
pose, for example, that better nutrition translates (among other things) into better
physiological health, as suggested by Fogel (1994). While the empirical litera-
ture surveyed in the Introduction ﬁnds that better nutrition improves students’
achievements, the improvement in nutrition may well increase physical ability
even more. Therefore, such improvements in health may change the compara-
tive advantage in favor of performing manual labor. Although we cannot argue
that health has no effect on education investment in the transition from stagna-
tion to growth, examples of the type presented here cast doubts on the relevance
of health in generating economic growth by means of education.
4 Concluding Remarks
Bucking the conventional wisdom, we have argued that greater longevity cannot
explain the signiﬁcant accumulation of human capital during the transition from
stagnation to growth. This is because greater longevity raises children’s future
income proportionally at all levels of education, leaving the relative return be-
tween quality and quantity unaffected. Our theory also casts doubts on recent
ﬁndings about a positive effect of health on education. This is because health
raises the marginal return on quality and quantity, resulting in an ambiguous
effect on the accumulation of human capital. Thus, we conclude that longevity
22The frequently used Cobb-Douglas production does not satisﬁed 9. Inequality 9 holds for
any constant return to scale (CRS) human capital production function in the range in which the
elasticity of substitution between education and health is less than 1.
11and health have little if any effect on the transition from stagnation to growth via
investment in education.
Our model suggests an additional result that casts even greater doubt on the
relevance of the Ben-Porath mechanism for prescribing investment in education
during the transition from stagnation to growth. We showed that even when fer-
tility is exogenous, the mere fact that parents decide on the education of their
children rather than individuals for themselves, does not guarantee that the Ben
Porath mechanism holds. The rationale is that when an individual decides on her
level of education she chooses the level that maximizes her lifetime consumption,
i.e., education is a pure investment. When she chooses her child’s level of educa-
tion, however, she has to forgo some of her consumption to increase her child’s
education. Thus the distinct roles played by one’s own education and one’s chil-
dren’s education impose restrictions on parental preferences in order to generate
the Ben-Porath mechanism.
Our theory is more consistent with the historical evidence than other studies
that model the relationship among longevity, human-capital accumulation, and
population. As shown in Part 2, life expectancy has been increasing monotoni-
cally at least since the beginning of the eighteenth century while investment in
formal education was negligible until the mid-nineteenth century.
Furthermore, our ”neutrality result” is robust. Pursuant to a vast literature,
weassumethatparentsmaximizetheirchildren’sfullincome.23 Infact, thisresult
holds for a broader set of preferences. When longevity is disregarded, parental
preferences are deﬁned over the number of children (quantity) and each child’s
level of human capital (quality). When longevity is incorporated into the analy-
sis, however, it stands to reason that parental utility is derived from the expected
number of children as well as from each child’s expected level of human capital,
i.e., W = U(c)+V (¼n;¼h(e)). Consequently, the ”neutrality result” holds as long
as preferences are homothetic with respect to the quantity and quality of their
children.24
23See Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2002), Hazan and
Berdugo (2002), Lagerlof (2003), and Moav (2005), among others.
24Furthermore, even if preferences are deﬁned for the number of children as well as the lifetime
earnings of each child, the ”neutrality result” holds if W = U(c) + V (n + ln(¼h(e))) , i.e., if the
sub-utility from children is quasi-linear.
12Our theory suggests a new guideline for investigation of the empirical rela-
tionship between health and education. We have shown the relevance of fertility
choice for examination of the effect of health on education. In particular, our the-
ory suggests that abstracting from fertility choice hides the true impact of health
improvements on the investment in education.25
Finally, our theory has important policy implications for international aid to
poor countries. It suggests that although health interventions may be justiﬁed by
their direct contribution to quality of life and per-capita income, when tallying
up the costs and beneﬁts of these interventions one should bear in mind that
longevity and health have no effect on the relative return on education.
25Behrman and Lavy (1997) control for fertility by including family ﬁxed effects. Interestingly,
their ﬁnding is consistent with our theory.
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